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CRIMINAL LAW—GIVE ME FREEDOM!: HOW
AMBIGUOUS FEDERAL SUPERVISED RELEASE CONDITIONS
UNDERMINE THE PURPOSE OF THE SENTENCING REFORM
ACT
Igor V. Bykov *
Vagueness, as the word suggests, is inherently uncertain. This Note
addresses the issues of vagueness presented by unclear supervised
release conditions, as well as discusses the split of authority
pertaining thereto. Specifically, the condition discussed throughout
the Note prohibits defendants from frequenting places where
controlled substances are illegally present. Because federal appellate
courts differ as to the condition’s meaning and its application, the
existing circuit split will be thoroughly discussed. The main issues
with the condition demonstrate a lack of attentiveness and forethought
of the sentencing judges that ultimately impose undue hardships onto
the defendants wishing to enter back into society. Furthermore, due
to the lack of clarity of the proscribed terms, defendants may be
uncertain as to what behavior is permitted and what act may result in
re-incarceration. Since the proscribed terms are subject to varying
interpretations, the defendants subject to this condition may find it
difficult to obey. This Note will argue that the imposition of vague
supervised release conditions is contradictory to the rehabilitative
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purpose of supervised release, and will urge the sentencing courts to
exercise greater caution when imposing terms of federal supervision.
This will ensure that defendants are not subject to unclear terms that
may be unintentionally violated.

INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Sentencing Reform Act by Congress in 1984, 1 as
a part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 2 catalyzed the
abolishment of federal parole.3 Prior to the establishment of the
Sentencing Reform Act, Congress had the power to outline the sentencing
ranges, and the courts were given the discretion to impose sentences
within those ranges on a case-by-case basis. 4 In its stead, Congress
created the United States Sentencing Commission,5 an independent body
within the judicial branch, tasked with “provid[ing] certainty and fairness
in . . . sentencing.” 6 After the Sentencing Reform Act’s passage, the
Sentencing Commission implemented guidelines in sentencing, 7 under
which “district judges determine[d] sentences based on the various
offense-related and offender-related factors identified [in] the
Guidelines . . . . 8 These factors, as provided by the United States Code,
mandated that the sentencing court—when determining the severity of the
sentence to be imposed—consider the nature and circumstances of the
offense committed, as well as the need for the imposition of a sentence. 9
1. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987.
2. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2018). See also Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing
Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 958, 984 (2013).
On June 25, 1910, Congress enacted a parole statute for prisoners housed in federal
institutions. The new statute applied only to those confined for a definite term of
more than a year, whose record of conduct demonstrated that they had obeyed the
rules of the institution, and who had served at least one-third of their sentences.
Id. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 3 (2020). “The SRA and
contemporaneous federal sentencing legislation created a fundamentally different sentencing
system from the prior system, with the guidelines being the central feature and with parole no
longer available for offenders convicted of offenses committed on or after November 1, 1987.”
Id.
4. 3 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 103:2, Westlaw (database updated June 2020). See also 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (1984), invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In
Pepper v. U.S., the Court rendered the referenced section of the Guidelines as advisory and
invalidated the requirement for sentencing courts “to impose a sentence within the [applicable]
Guidelines range.” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 494 (2011).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 991.
6. Id. at § 991 (b)(1)(B). 3 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 103:42, Westlaw (database updated
June 2020).
7. 3 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 103:42, Westlaw (database updated June 2020).
8. Id.
9. 18 § 3553(a)(1)–(2). 3 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 103:2, Westlaw (database updated
June 2020).
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Specifically, the sentence must
. . . reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
. . . afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
. . . protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
. . . provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner. 10

These factors were established to ensure that sentences were not
disparate, but rather congruent in relation to the offense committed, as
originally envisioned by the legislators when enacting the 1984 Act. 11
In addition to establishing uniformity in sentencing, the Act created a
new form of post-imprisonment supervision known as supervised
release. 12 This new form of supervision, unlike the old system of parole,
did “not replace a portion of the sentence of imprisonment, but rather
[acted as] an order of supervision in addition to any term of imprisonment
imposed by the court.” 13 Its creation required the courts to impose a
period of supervised release after either a sentence of one year or more, or
when required by the statute. 14 If a court believes a period of supervised
release is necessary, it “must impose certain mandatory conditions,
including explicit conditions [prohibiting the] defendant [from
committing] another federal, state, or local crime, and [from possessing]
illegal controlled substances.” 15 Additionally, pursuant to Section
5D1.3(b) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the courts must rely
on a set of factors when determining what type of a sentence to impose. 16
The courts, when imposing a sentence, must consider: the nature of the
circumstances; the need of the sentence imposed; types of sentences
available; suggestions by applicable agencies; any relevant policies;
10. 18 § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(D).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (2018). U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE
BASICS 3 (2020).
12. 3 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 103:42, Westlaw (database updated June 2020); U.S.
SENTENCING
COMM’N,
PRIMER
ON
SUPERVISED
RELEASE
1
(2019),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2019_Primer_Supervised_Releas
e.pdf.
13. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. background (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 3 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 103:42, Westlaw (database updated
June 2020).
14. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018).
15. 3 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 103:42, Westlaw (database updated June 2020); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (detailing
mandatory conditions of supervised release).
16. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018).
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prevention of unwarranted sentence disparities; as well as the need to
recompense the victim. 17 The sentence “must be ‘reasonably related’ to
the nature of the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, or the
relevant purposes of punishment.” 18 The sentence must be tailored as to
provide the offender with educational, vocational training as a step
towards rehabilitation, as well as to deter any criminal conduct. 19 The
sentence must not involve any greater deprivation of liberty than
necessary to deter future criminal acts and to protect the public, and can
be implemented if the sentence’s terms are “consistent with any pertinent
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .” 20
Supervised release is a widely used judicial mechanism to ensure that
recently released inmates receive adequate supervision after completing
their prison sentences. 21 Meant to serve as a more individual approach,
supervised release granted the courts permission to assign conditions
based on the varying levels of offenses. 22 The conditions are chosen from
three groups: mandatory, discretionary, or special (or otherwise
appropriate). 23 The difference in the conditions imposed is future-focused
and outcome-based: “For long-term prisoners, [supervised release] should
facilitate reintegration, and for select prisoners with short-term prison
sentences, it would provide for rehabilitation and supervision.” 24

17. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7) (1984).
18. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 8 (2020).
19. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2018). Accord U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5D1.3(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
21. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of Federal
Supervised Release, 18 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 180, 180 (2013) (“More than 95 percent of people
sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the federal system are also sentenced to a term of [postimprisonment supervision]. Since it was first established in the late 1980s, nearly one million
people have been sentenced to federal supervised release.”).
22. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(b) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018) (“The court may impose other conditions of supervised release to the extent that
such conditions[] are reasonably related to[] the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant . . . .”).
23. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(b) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018); see also Nora V. Demleitner, How to Change the Philosophy and Practice of
Probation and Supervised Release: Data Analytics, Cost Control, Focus on Reentry, and a
Clear Mission, 28 FED. SENT’G. REP. 231, 232 (2016) (“Without regard to individual risk or
needs, courts seem to impose at least all the standard discretionary conditions.”).
24. Demleitner, supra note 23, at 232. See also S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 124 (1983).
[T]he primary goal of such a term is to ease the defendant’s transition into the
community after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious offense,
or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short period in prison
for punishment or other purposes but still needs supervision and training programs
after release.
Id.
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Ambiguous terms of post-imprisonment supervision, however, undermine
the future-focused and outcome-based goals of supervised release. 25
Instead of providing “certainty and fairness in . . . sentencing,” 26 by
tailoring conditions to individual offender’s needs, the courts are imposing
terms of post-imprisonment supervision more broadly. 27
The courts disregard the individual needs of defendants when they
impose heavy-handed conditions of supervised release, especially when
the conditions are ambiguous and fail to provide clear limitations on
defendants’ conduct. 28 For example, the condition forbidding the
defendant from “frequent[ing] places where controlled substances are
illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered,” 29—which will be
referred to as the frequenting condition throughout—is ambiguous and has
been challenged in multiple jurisdictions. Unfortunately, there is a lack
of uniformity in decisions regarding the condition’s terms. 30 The Seventh
Circuit, with regards to the analyzed condition, is of different opinion than
its Ninth and Tenth counterparts.31 The Seventh Circuit ruled that this
condition is riddled with ambiguities and is, therefore, unconstitutional. 32
To the contrary, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits found the same condition to
be free of constitutional deficiencies and affirmed its imposition. 33 When
the Third Circuit faced a similar issue they left it undisturbed, reasoning
that no plain error was committed by the sentencing court due to the
existing split of authority. 34 It therefore did not reach the question of the
conditions’ merits. 35 Although the condition in question was stricken
from the Sentencing Guidelines in 2016, 36 it nonetheless deserves
25. See Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Failure of Parole: Rethinking the Role of the
State in Reentry, 41 N.M. L. REV. 421, 448–50 (2011) (finding that some supervision conditions
can inhibit the successful reentry of people on parole).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2018). See also 3 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 103:2, Westlaw
(database updated June 2020).
27. See Demleitner, supra note 23, at 232 (noting that “federal judges commonly—almost
reflexively—impose a term of supervised release (SR) upon discharge from prison, even if not
statutorily required to do so.”).
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 757 F. App’x 139 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v.
Llantada, 815 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2016); United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir.
2015); United States v. Phillips, 704 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 2012).
30. See, e.g., Barry, 757 F. App’x 139; Llantada, 815 F.3d 679; Thompson, 777 F.3d
368; Phillips, 704 F.3d 754.
31. Compare Llantada, 815 F.3d 679, and Phillips, 704 F.3d 794 (holding that the
condition prohibiting the defendants from frequenting places where controlled substances are
illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered is not vague), with Thompson, 777 F.3d 368
(holding that the aforementioned condition is impermissibly vague).
32. See Thompson, 777 F.3d at 379.
33. See Llantada, 815 F.3d 679; Phillips, 704 F.3d 754.
34. See Barry, 757 F. App’x 139.
35. Id.
36. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 44
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attention.
This Note examines the circuit split, focusing primarily on whether
the condition—prohibiting defendants from frequenting places where
controlled substances are illegally sold, used, administered, or
distributed—is impermissibly vague. This Note uses the Third Circuit’s
United States v. Barry decision to better illustrate the vagueness issue
raised by the Defendant. Furthermore, this Note urges the courts to be
more attentive when subjecting defendants to unclear terms of postimprisonment supervision. Finally, potential remedies to reconcile the
circuit split and help achieve uniformity and fairness in sentencing will be
provided.
Part I will lay the foundation for the issue by analyzing appellatelevel decisions that have confronted the vagueness issue. Although the
condition addressed throughout this Note was stricken from the
Sentencing Guidelines, its impact has not been fully curtailed. Since the
condition was removed recently, there is still a class of people subject to
the it’s vague terms who, like the defendants in cases central to the Note’s
discussion, will suffer because of the condition’s vagueness. Part II will
present the arguments for why vague supervised release conditions are
problematic. Part III will provide potential remedies to mend the circuit
schism. Moreover, this Note will urge the sentencing courts to modify
their reasoning to incorporate more practicality and forethought when
imposing terms of supervised release so as to avoid further appellate
litigation and unnecessary curtailment of defendants’ rights.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
This Note will focus on the circuit split between the Seventh and the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits in regard to the frequenting condition. As the
law stands, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits held that the condition’s terms
are unambiguous and problem-free, whereas the Seventh Circuit deemed
the condition to be unconstitutionally vague. Since the courts are split,
the condition must be scrutinized for constitutional deficiencies.
A. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits
The prohibition on frequenting places where controlled substances
are illegally used or sold first reached the appellate level in 2012. In
United States v. Phillips, Defendant Phillips, convicted of multiple counts
of wire and mail fraud, as well as two counts of money laundering,
appealed his forty-eight-month prison term and subsequent three-yearperiod of supervised release. 37 Phillips argued that the frequenting
condition is “so vague and overbroad that it would prohibit him from
(2016),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendlyamendments/20160428_RF.pdf.
37. Id. at 754, 757.
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visiting many neighborhoods in Seattle where he lived before
[imprisonment],” and therefore precludes him from “living and working
in [the city] altogether.” 38 Phillips also argued that the condition “leaves
[him] so confused about what he can and cannot do that it restricts his
freedom of movement.” 39
The Ninth Circuit found Phillips’s arguments unpersuasive. 40 To
clarify the condition’s terms, the court incorporated a mens rea element. 41
Ultimately, the court held that men of common intelligence would
interpret “the prohibition on ‘frequenting places’ where illegal drugs are
used or sold” as “knowingly going to a specific place where drugs are
illegally used or sold.” 42 The Ninth Circuit further ruled “that [the
condition] does not prohibit [the defendant] from living in Seattle or going
to a given neighborhood simply because a person is selling drugs
somewhere within that neighborhood.” 43 Instead, the court noted that
“incidental contact with [prohibited] places here would not constitute
‘frequenting.’ Frequent in this context means to ‘be in often or
habitually.’” 44 Consequently, when applying a common sense reading of
the terms at issue, the condition, according to the Ninth Circuit, was
neither overbroad nor impermissibly vague. 45
The Tenth Circuit reviewed a similar issue in 2016.46 In United States
v. Llantada, the Defendant “pleaded guilty to charges arising from a drug
conspiracy in 2014,” and was sentenced to 168 months of imprisonment. 47
In addition to the prison sentence, Llantada was subject to terms of postimprisonment supervision. 48 The frequenting condition was one of these
terms. 49
The defendant contended that the condition imposed strict liability on
defendants who, whether knowingly or not, violated the condition. 50
Unpersuaded, the Tenth Circuit found that “[t]he most reasonable
38. Id. at 767.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 767.
41. Id. The mens rea element forbids the defendant from knowingly violating his
condition’s terms, as opposed to accidental or unintentional violation thereof. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. (2003)).
45. Id.
46. United States v. Llantada, 815 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2016). C.f. United States v. Evans,
883 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2018) (The Evans court did not agree with Llantada, because, under a
common-sense approach, probation officers will have difficulty understanding and applying the
condition.)).
47. Id. at 681.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 682.
50. Id. at 684.
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interpretation of the condition is that it prohibits [the defendant] from
going to places only if he knows that drugs are used or sold there.’” 51 A
similar strict-liability argument was also rejected in United States v.
Muñoz, an earlier Tenth Circuit decision holding that a literal reading of
the terms frequent and place is not inadequate as a matter of law. 52 The
Tenth Circuit held that “[t]he probation officer, and any judges tasked with
deciding whether [the condition was violated], must interpret the
condition in a reasonable, commonsense manner.” 53
B. The Seventh Circuit
Three years after the issuance of the Phillips decision, the Seventh
Circuit faced a similar issue in United States v. Thompson. 54 Thompson,
as the first defendant in the consolidated opinion, “was sentenced to 210
months in prison,” 55 after being “convicted [for] possession of child
pornography, and [for] traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of
engaging in sexual conduct, in violation of federal laws.” 56 The second
defendant, Ortiz, “pleaded guilty to three bank robberies and was
sentenced to prison for 135 months [as well as] twenty-one conditions of
supervised release.” 57 The third defendant, Bates, charged with the
distribution of crack cocaine, “was sentenced to 188 months in prison” 58
and, like others before him, was subject to “the usual [thirteen] standard
conditions and five others (though for eight years, rather than the three
years in Ortiz’s case).” 59 Finally, the last defendant, Blount, was
sentenced to 300 months in prison “for running an extensive organization
engaged in the sale of heroin.” 60
Out of the four consolidated cases addressed in the Thompson
opinion, only Defendant Ortiz was subject to the frequenting condition. 61
However, all of the cases in the consolidated opinion followed a similar
trend: the imposed supervised release conditions were not challenged at
the time of their imposition, but rather were confronted on appeal.
Accordingly, the challenge permitted the Seventh Circuit to take a closer
look at the condition’s deficiencies. 62

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. (quoting United States v. Muñoz, 812 F.3d 809, 823 (10th Cir. 2016)).
Id.
Id.
United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Id. at 380–81.
See id. at 379.
Id. at 372.
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As a proponent of striking the condition, the Seventh Circuit
pronounced that condition is riddled with ambiguities. 63 First, the court
noted that there is “no requirement that [the defendant] know or have
reason to know or even just suspect that [the prohibited] activities are
taking place.” 64 Additionally, the court acknowledged that there is no
numerical value assigned to the term frequent. 65 Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit ruled that the condition imposed was impermissibly vague. 66 The
court emphasized that the limitations of the conditions should be specified
by the sentencing court, “rather than [being left] to the appellate courts”
to decide. 67 Due to lack of judicial guidance regarding the condition’s
prohibitions, the defendant “may think himself bound by the broader
interpretation” 68 of the condition, rather than its intended, narrowly
construed meaning. 69 An analogy employed by the court is illustrative in
elucidating the conundrum:
If you’re [ninety] percent certain that purchasing girl-scout cookies
from someone who rings your doorbell wouldn’t violate a condition
of supervised release, do you want to risk going back to prison because
you may have guessed wrong? If out of caution therefore you decline
to purchase the cookies, the sentencing guideline will deter lawful
conduct, and thus be overbroad. 70

As the court provides, ordinary everyday conduct could subject one
to re-incarceration. 71 In order to err on the side of caution, a defendant
subject to unclear parameters may choose to abstain from otherwise legal
endeavors in order to avoid another prison sentence. Because the
condition can be violated through innocent conduct, defendants are forced
to take extraordinary precautions to avoid re-incarceration. As a result,
defendants may avoid lawful conduct and have their liberty curtailed —
an unintended consequence of supervised release. Finding the frequenting
condition to be unduly restrictive, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court’s decision, vacated the defendants’ entire sentences, and remanded
the cases for further proceedings. 72

63. Id. at 379.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 380.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 382 (opining that “reconsideration of [the] conditions [imposed] may
conceivably induce one or more of the judges to alter the prison sentence that he imposed.”).
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C. The Third Circuit’s Illustrative Example: United States v. Barry
Soulemane Barry “pleaded guilty to using and attempting to use
‘counterfeit access devices’[,] . . . possessing [fifteen] or more counterfeit
access devices[,] . . . and conspiring to commit access device fraud in
violation of [federal law].” 73 As a consequence for his wrongdoings, the
district court sentenced Barry to a five-year term of supervised release,
without imposing a period of incarceration. 74 The conditions imposed
upon the Defendant mandated that Barry “‘not frequent places where
controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered’
and . . . ’not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity’ or
‘with any persons convicted of a felony’ without his probation officer’s
permission.” 75
Two and a half years later, Barry’s period of supervised release was
revoked because he “stabbed two people, travelled outside of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania without permission, used controlled substances,
stopped attending a drug-treatment program, and did not report to his
probation officer as directed.” 76 This time, the district court sentenced
Barry to fourteen months of imprisonment and a two-year term of
supervised release, where he was subject to the same conditions that were
initially imposed upon him. 77 On appeal, Barry argued that the court
plainly erred by imposing the constitutionally-deficient conditions. 78
Focusing specifically on the frequenting condition, Barry argued that
there was no clear indication of “how many trips result in ‘frequenting’
sites of drug activity, nor does it clarify whether he must knowingly be in
such a place to violate it[,]” 79 using the Seventh Circuit decision to support
his contention. 80 Moreover, Barry noted that the controlled-substance
condition was eliminated from the Sentencing Guidelines by the
Sentencing Commission “because [the Commission] concluded that the
controlled-substance condition was ‘encompassed by’” a condition
forbidding the defendant from associating with criminals.81
The Third Circuit, recognizing the split of authority regarding the
73. United States v. Barry, 757 F. App’x 139, 140 (3d Cir. 2018).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Barry did not challenge the association or the controlled-substance conditions in
the district court, but instead pled that the sentencing judge committed plain error. To prevail
under the plain-error doctrine, the respondent must demonstrate “that (1) an error occurred; (2)
the error is ‘obvious’; and (3) the error ‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’”
Id. at 141 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). See also United
States v. Garrasteguy, 559 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 2009).
79. Barry, 757 F. App’x at 141.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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controlled-substance condition, opined that “reasonable minds may differ
as to [the] condition’s meaning and application and that this condition may
be unconstitutionally vague.” 82 The court concluded that because of the
circuit split, the district court’s imposition of the condition upon the
Defendant was not in plain error. 83 Instead of remanding the case back to
the District Court, the Third Circuit affirmed the order, but emphasized
the importance for the sentencing courts to impose updated conditions
recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines in place of the removed
ones. 84
D. Removal of the Frequenting Condition from the Sentencing
Guidelines
As previously noted in the discussion of Soulemane Barry’s case, the
condition analyzed was removed from the Sentencing Guidelines on April
28, 2016. 85 The reason behind this amendment is that the Federal
Sentencing Commission “determined that [the condition is either] best
dealt with as [a] special condition[] or [is] redundant with other
conditions.” 86 The Commission indicated that “the prohibition on
frequenting places where controlled substances are illegally sold is
encompassed by the ‘standard’ condition that defendants not associate
with those they know to be criminals or who are engaged in criminal
activity.” 87
Although this condition was removed, its removal is not retroactively
applied. When the condition was removed in 2016, there were 192,170
people incarcerated in a federal prison. 88 Because there are defendants
still subject to the stricken condition’s ambiguous terms, the vagueness
issue persists.

82. Id.
83. Id. See supra text accompanying note 78.
84. Barry, 757 F. App’x at 142.
85. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 44
(2016),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendlyamendments/20160428_RF.pdf.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 45. The new condition, inserted instead of the one analyzed in this Note,
prohibits defendants from “communicat[ing] or interact[ing] with someone the defendant knows
is engaged in criminal activity. If the defendant knows someone has been convicted of a felony,
the defendant shall not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting
the permission of the probation officer.” Amendment 803, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendment/803 (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
88. Statistics: Past Inmate Population Totals for FY 2016, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp.
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II. UNCLEAR SUPERVISED RELEASE CONDITIONS CREATE UNDUE
DIFFICULTIES FOR DEFENDANTS SUBJECT TO THEM
Appellate courts are split regarding the vagueness of the frequenting
condition, where the Seventh Circuit was persuaded by the vagueness
argument, while the Ninth and Tenth Circuits were not. 89 This Note will
be primarily focused on the case of Soulemane Barry, who was subject to
the condition’s terms. Using the case for illustrative purposes, this Note
will argue that vague conditions of supervised release are problematic.
Specifically, vague conditions pose undue restraints on defendants’
freedom and subject them to a life of uncertainty, where one wrong
decision could result in incarceration. The frequenting condition violates
defendants’ due process rights, negatively impacts their reintegration into
the community, and contradicts the rehabilitative and integrating purposes
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 90 The courts’ failure in providing
the needed clarity impacts recidivism rates and shifts the judicial power,
thereby allowing probation officers to determine whether a violation was
committed. By vesting the probation officers with such power, Article III
of the Constitution is violated, and judicial review is circumvented.
A. Vague Supervised Release Conditions Violate Due Process of Law
The vagueness doctrine is grounded in the concepts of “fairness, and
thus requires that individuals are given ‘fair warning’ of their legal
obligations.” 91 In United States v. Maloney, 92 the Third Circuit held that
“a condition of supervised release violates due process and is void for
vagueness if it ‘either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.’” 93 The court further noted that
supervised release conditions “must provide specific standards [to] avoid
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 94 Because the condition cast
on Barry, Phillips, Llandata, and Thompson grants no specific and
articulable standards and can be arbitrarily enforced, it violates due
process. 95 Moreover, since reasonable sophisticated legal minds differ as
to the condition’s application, the imposition of this vague condition has

89. See supra Section I.A–C.
90. See infra Section III.A–C.
91. United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2008).
92. The condition at issue required the defendant “to notify his probation officer of
questioning by law enforcement officers.” Id. at 352.
93. Id. at 357 (quoting United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 2003)).
94. Id. (quoting Tolchin v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 111 F.3d 1099, 1115 (3d Cir.
1997)).
95. See, e.g., Collins v. State 911 N.E.2d 700, 713 (2009) (holding that a defendant has a
due process right to conditions of supervised release that are sufficiently clear in order to provide
notice regarding what conduct will result in a return to prison).
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the effect that the Maloney Court sought to prevent. 96 Because the
frequenting condition is ambiguous, it requires judicial scrutiny.
The minority stance taken by the Seventh Circuit offers the proper
ruling relative to the frequenting condition. The Thompson court
emphasized the need for clarity and specificity regarding prohibitions of
supervised release. 97 Furthermore, the court mentioned that the
determination of what conduct is appropriate and what is prohibited
should be left for the sentencing courts. 98 Instead of dedicating such
delicate and crucial matters to the probation officers, the courts must be
the ones to prescribe clear standards and avoid the confusion. 99 By
imposing clear and unambiguous terms of supervised release, the courts
avoid arbitrary enforcement and unnecessary litigation that would
otherwise be needed to establish boundaries of permitted conduct. 100 The
imposition of clear and unambiguous parameters would prevent recentlyreleased criminal defendants from avoiding lawful conduct in fear of
violating the conditions. 101
Supervised release “was created ‘to assist offenders in their
integration back into society and to provide the court with the means to
quickly intervene if an offender is a risk to [themselves], or to others.’” 102
Reintegration into society is not achieved by unduly restrictive and
unclear conditions imposed upon defendants. 103 Because the unclear
supervised release conditions force the defendant to err on the side of
caution, the defendant’s freedom is unreasonably restricted. 104 Although
restrictions on defendant’s liberties are inherently ingrained in the terms
of supervised release, vague conditions go beyond acceptable restrictions
96. Maloney, 513 F.3d at 357 (stating that a condition is vague if it fails to “provide
specific standards which avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”).
97. See generally id.
98. Id. at 380.
99. Id.
100 See Maloney, 513 F.3d at 359 (noting that “[i]t is important that conditions of
supervision be drafted with sufficient specificity to ensure that they do not result in the arbitrary
enforcement of supervised release.”).
101. United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2015).
102. Demleitner, supra note 23, at 232.
103. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL21364, SUPERVISED RELEASE
(PAROLE):
AN
ABBREVIATED
OUTLINE
OF
FEDERAL
LAW
4
(2015),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21364.pdf (“The courts’ general discretionary authority to order
conditions of supervised release is likewise bound by the requirement that it ‘involve no greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’ for the reasonably related purposes. The
assessment is one of balancing.”). See also United States v. Garrasteguy, 559 F.3d 34, 44 (1st
Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the constitutional rights of supervised releasees and
probationers are limited . . . such individuals, by virtue of their status, do not forfeit all of their
constitutional rights.”).
104. See Thompson, 777 F.3d at 380 (stating that if a defendant, out of fear of violating
terms of supervised release, is precluded from acting lawfully, the condition’s terms are
overbroad and therefore impermissible).
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on freedom. 105 Ambiguous supervised release conditions are inherently
overbroad and, thus, deter legal conduct. 106 Ultimately, vague supervised
release conditions deprive defendants of liberty without due process of
law. 107
If a defendant is unsure whether his conduct is prohibited or
permitted, it comes as no surprise that the defendant subject to supervised
release would avoid any potentially prohibited conduct. This contradicts
the purpose of supervised release, which is meant to serve rehabilitative,
rather than punitive goals. 108 The need for a causal nexus, deterrence, and
rehabilitation must be honored when the conditions are imposed. 109 This
is so, because the conditions–if imposed–”must involve no greater
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to accomplish the
purpose of federal sentencing.” 110 As a result, one subject to vague
parameters “may encounter difficulty obeying the condition, despite a
good faith desire to do so.” 111
The fundamental rehabilitative purpose of supervised release must
not be vague and must not pose an unreasonable restriction of liberty. 112
Therefore, when a supervised release condition is impermissibly vague,
the condition goes beyond the limits envisioned by the United States
Sentencing Commission and unreasonably restricts defendants’
constitutional rights. 113 These unreasonable restrictions are a violation of
due process and are, therefore, unconstitutional. 114 “It is important to
ensure that if such a condition is imposed, the proscribed area must be set
out in clear terms, because vagueness in the description of the proscribed
area can result in such a condition being ineffective and even stricken on
105. SARAH N. WELLING, 3 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 548 (4th ed.) (database updated
June 2020).
106. See Thompson, 777 F.3d at 380 (holding that if one is precluded from acting
lawfully, out of fear of violating the terms, their freedom is restricted).
107. See supra note 95 and accompanying text; see also CHRISTINE M. G. DAVIS ET AL.,
20 N.Y. JUR. 2D CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 432 (database updated June 2020) (“[A] law lacks
due process if it is so vague that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or
leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited
and what is not.”).
108. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124 (1983).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. NEIL P. COHEN, LAW OF PROBATION & PAROLE § 7:19 (2d ed.) (database updated
July 2019).
112. See United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 357 (3rd Cir. 2008) (stating that the
“vagueness doctrine is premised on fairness, and thus requires that individuals are given ‘fair
warning’ of their legal obligations.”).
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2018).
114. Maloney, 513 F.3d at 357 (“[A] condition of supervised release violates due process
and is void for vagueness if it ‘either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.’”).
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appeal.” 115 Because the condition imposed on the previously listed
defendants does not proscribe specific prohibited areas and fails to specify
how many trips constitute frequenting and what places are considered offlimits, the condition, ab initio, 116 is impermissible. 117 Defendants, subject
to the condition’s vague terms, must receive a reconsideration to cure
deficiencies of the condition’s unclear parameters. 118
B. Ambiguous Supervised Release Conditions Increase Recidivism
Rates
Sentencing courts very frequently impose terms of postimprisonment supervision. 119 According to a report published by the
United States Sentencing Commission, more than ninety-five percent of
people sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the federal system
“received terms of supervised release.” 120 Since the establishment of the
Sentencing Reform Act in 1984, “nearly one million [people sentenced to
imprisonment] have been sentenced to terms of supervised release.” 121
Although supervised release is an important factor in improving public
safety and advancing the reintegration of defendants into society, “there
is little empirical evidence that post-prison supervision” accomplishes
those goals. 122
It should also be noted that “[w]ith nearly 190,000 inmates, the
federal prison system is the largest in the nation.” 123 But prison walls do
115. NEIL P. COHEN, LAW OF PROBATION & PAROLE § 10:6 (2d ed.) (database updated
July 2020). See also U.S. v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 849 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that a condition
of supervised release prohibiting defendant from “frequent[ing] places where controlled
substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered” was impermissibly ambiguous;
it contained no indication of how many trips constituted “frequent[ing]” such places, and, read
literally, improperly imposed strict liability).
116. That is, from the very imposition of the condition.
117. DAVIS ET AL., supra note 107 (“[C]onstitutional requirement of definiteness is
violated by a [condition] that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
or her contemplated conduct is forbidden.”).
118. See United States v. Murray, 692 F.3d 273, 283 (3d Cir. 2012) (requesting the
sentencing court to “more clearly explain why [the]. . . release conditions are no greater than
necessary to satisfy the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.”). Id.
119. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO SUPERVISED
RELEASE
3–4
(2010),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-publications/2010/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 3.
122. Scott-Hayward, supra note 21, at 202.
123. Number of Offenders on Federal Supervised Release Hits All-Time High, PEW (Jan.
2017),
https://www.pewtrusts.org//media/assets/2017/01/number_of_offenders_on_federal_supervised_release_hits_alltime_hig
h.pdf [hereinafter Number of Offenders]; see also Judicial Business 2015, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2015 (last visited Sept. 23, 2020)
(stating that 114,961 persons were serving terms of supervised release).
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not contain the reach of the federal correction system; supervised release
was created as a form of post-imprisonment supervision where
defendants’ freedom is constrained. 124 In 2015, approximately 115,000
offenders were subject to supervised release. 125 “More than [eight] in
[ten] offenders sentenced to federal prison also undergo court-ordered
supervised release.” 126 “Congress created supervised release in 1984 as a
way to help former inmates [make the] transition back into the community
and reduce rates of reoffending.” 127 But there is minimal empirical
evidence that supervised release supports the accomplishment of the goals
set out by Congress. 128
On the contrary, there is ample evidence demonstrating that
supervised release not only fails to meet Congressional goals, but
conversely has drastic implications. 129 “One common result [of postimprisonment supervision] is that more offenders are sent to prison for
violating the terms of their supervision . . . than for new crimes.” 130 The
negative consequences of supervised release do not end there. Evidence
shows that “[m]ore than two-thirds of all federal offenders who are
revoked from supervised release each year committed technical violations
but were not convicted of new crimes.” 131 If the conditions imposed on
the defendants are not clear at the time of their imposition, the odds are
not in the defendants’ favor. This is especially frightening considering
that the purpose of supervised release is to promote reintegration and aid
the defendant in assimilating back into the community, not to place
recently released offenders back behind bars. Without defining key terms
such as frequency and places, defendants are not awarded fair warning
due to failure in spelling out which areas are permitted, and which are
prohibited. 132
Although initially, supervised release was meant to minimize rates of
recidivism, the intended effect is not achieved by post-prison
supervision. 133 This notion is underlined by Nora Demleitner, who states
that “[i]n making these proscriptions conditions of supervised release,
Congress has not banned any additional activities; it has just made it
significantly easier to send released ‘criminals’ to prison for any alleged

124. Number of Offenders, supra note 123.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Scott-Hayward, supra note 21, at 202.
129. Number of Offenders, supra note 123.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2008).
133. See United States v. Jeanes, 150 F.3d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that “[t]he
supervised release term serves a broader, societal purpose by reducing recidivism.”).
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violation of existing law.” 134 The ease with which defendants can be
resentenced to a prison term furthers the marginalization of “people who
have been previously adjudicated as criminals.” 135 By subjecting
defendants to a “form of cheapened control with respect to substantial
amounts of non-criminal” behavior, 136 the goal of reintegration and
assimilation back into the community is undermined and those released
on federal supervision are branded as “belonging to a criminal class.” 137
Accordingly, defendants subject to unclear and ambiguous conditions
must decipher the condition’s terms to determine whether their conduct
falls within the permitted boundaries of the condition’s terms. This action
taken by the sentencing courts contradicts the purpose of the program that
was envisioned by the Sentencing Reform Act. 138 This guessing game can
have disastrous effects on defendants wishing to regain their freedom,
especially because the stakes for a wrong conclusion are so high. 139
Violations of terms can have unfortunate consequences and place
defendants back to square one, making a life free-of-crime and
“Violations of
governmental supervision more unattainable. 140
[supervised release] frequently cause a return to prison, often with new
supervisory terms attached. This has created the ‘threat of never-ending
supervision’ . . . .” 141 Thus, defendants subject to unclear terms of
supervised release may be stuck in a never-ending cycle, going from
imprisonment, to supervision, only to return to prison.
Sentencing judges have an adverse impact on the rates of
recidivism. 142 Since judges are the gatekeepers—standing between the
offender and their freedom—the imposition of ambiguous conditions
starts and ends with them. The power vested with the sentencing judges
can be used to decrease future violations, while allowing the court and the
134. Doherty, supra note 3, at 1019.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Anders Sleight, Probation Officers’ Authority to Determine Conditions of
Supervised Release and Restitution Payment: Fair or Foul?, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 117,
124 (2011) (“[T]he district court must order a probation officer to furnish the defendant with a
written statement that clearly and specifically describes the defendant’s conditions of supervised
release so that the defendant may have a guide to direct his conduct.”).
139. If a defendant (unintentionally or unknowingly) violates the condition’s terms, he
could be found in violation of the condition and may face a period of incarceration. Doherty,
supra note 3, at 1019.
140. See Demleitner, supra note 23, at 235 (“Sanctions imposed for probation violations,
however, frequently lead to disproportionate sentences, with probation merely becoming ‘a
staging area for eventual imprisonment.’”).
141. Id. at 232. See also Doherty, supra note 3, at 958.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 842 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The first
general principle sentencing judges should consider when imposing conditions of supervised
release is that it is important to give advance notice of the conditions being considered.”).
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probation team to focus on higher-risk individuals. 143 Their decisions
often have long-lasting impacts on defendants and their likelihood of reincarceration. 144 Thus, sentencing courts are integral in defendants’
reintegration process, considering that judges have the discretion of
imposing supervised release in warranted circumstances. 145 Additionally,
sentencing judges could minimize the total amount of conditions imposed
by prioritizing terms of supervised release that are specifically tailored to
each individual offender. 146 Finally, judges have the power to prematurely
terminate post-imprisonment supervision, if circumstances warrant such
an action. 147 Those persons should have individualized requirements
imposed and supervision provided to help prevent recidivism and assist
rehabilitation.” 148
Consequently, because supervised release is so frequently imposed,
it should come as no surprise that the high numbers of defendants subject
to its terms may also be subject to conditions that are vague in form and
application. 149 Therefore, when prohibited conduct is not explicitly
enumerated in the conditions’ language, a large number of defendants can
unknowingly violate their conditions. 150 Yet when an unintentional
violation occurs, the price to pay for it is drastic; the defendant found in
violation may be subject to another prison sentence.
Inexplicit language is especially worrisome because “people on
supervised release may be convicted of violating their [conditions] and
sent back to prison, for conduct that may or may not be criminal, based
simply on a finding of the preponderance of the evidence.” 151 Considering
that the burden of proof for finding that a violation of the condition has
occurred is so low—just a little more than fifty percent—the defendants
are at a risk of being found in violation of the conditions’ terms, even
when the violation was unintentional. 152
143. Demleitner, supra note 23, at 233.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Number of Offenders, supra note 123 (“The [Sentencing Commission’s] rules
required courts to impose supervised release terms in most felony cases.”).
150. Scott-Hayward, supra note 21, at 182 (as previously pointed out, more than 95
percent of defendants sentenced to a prison term are also sentenced to a term of supervised
release). See also Number of Offenders, supra, note 123.
151. Scott-Hayward, supra note 21, at 203. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2018).
152. Hargrove ex rel. Wise v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, No. 05-0694V, 2009
WL 1220986, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 14, 2009) (“It is axiomatic to say that the Petitioner bears the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence—which this Court has likened to fifty
percent and a feather—that a particular fact occurred . . . .”) See also Wilson v. Florida, 857
So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding a probation condition prohibiting defendant
from “associating with ‘persons who use illegal drugs’” to be “too vague and capable of
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Sentencing judges fail to consider the impact of vague supervised
release conditions, which can be observed from the courts’ continuous and
automatic imposition of supervised release terms, absent a clear need to
do so. This needless over-imposition of supervised release contradicts the
federal supervisions rehabilitative and re-integrating purposes. 153 Instead
of aiding the recently released defendants in entering back into society,
sentencing courts subject defendants to conditions that increase the
likelihood of re-incarceration. 154 When sentencing courts needlessly and
inattentively impose vague terms of supervised release, they erect barriers
standing between the defendants and their freedom.155 Large-scale
imposition of supervised release terms proved to be not only unnecessary,
but also pernicious for defendants seeking to enter back into society. 156
Without clear prohibitions, defendants may unknowingly violate their
terms and face another period of incarceration. 157 This fact should serve
as yet another reason for the sentencing courts to exercise greater caution
when broadly imposing terms of supervised release, especially when the
terms may be unclear or ambiguous.
C. Leaving the Determination of Whether the Defendant Violated the
Terms of Supervised Release in the Hands of Probation Officers Is
Impermissible per Article III
Probation officers have slowly permeated the judicial system, often
taking the enforcing role in post-imprisonment supervision. 158 Probation
unintentional violation”).
153. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 21 (“In most cases, supervised release is not
mandatory and yet judges consistently fail to exercise their discretion in this area and impose
supervised release in virtually all cases.”); see also Demleitner, supra note 23, at 232 (stating
that judges’ imposition of supervised release is done “almost reflexively”).
154. See Number of Offenders, supra note 123; see also supra notes 124–27 and
accompanying text.
155. See Demleitner, supra note 23, at 232 (explaining that because supervised release is
so widely imposed, vague conditions are bound to affect defendants. Therefore, sentencing
judges—by continuing to heavy-handedly impose terms of supervised release—hinder
defendants from regaining their freedom after serving their sentences in federal prisons.).
156. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 21, at 202 (“Although limited, national data on
recidivism that consider supervision status indicate that people released from prison without any
supervision are no more likely to commit new crimes than people released to parole or postprison supervision.”).
157. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRIMER ON SUPERVISED RELEASE 1 (2019),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2019_Primer_Supervised_Releas
e.pdf (“Once a defendant is serving a term of supervised release and violates one or more of the
conditions, the court may decide whether to continue, revoke, or terminate the term of
supervised release and whether to modify the conditions of supervision or impose a term of
incarceration for the violation.”).
158. See Amanda Rios, Arms of the Court: Authorizing the Delegation of Sentencing
Discretion to Probation Officers, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 436 (2011) (“[A]s the
‘eyes and ears’ of the court, probation officers act[] as indispensable entities in the rehabilitation
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officers are prison systems’ social workers because of their “dual role both
to prohibit ‘behavior that is deemed dangerous to the restoration of the
individual into normal society’ and to give probationers guidance.” 159 As
noted by Anders Sleight, “[i]f a defendant’s sentence . . . includes a term
of supervised release, then a probation officer supervises the defendant
once he completes his term of imprisonment.” 160 The duties of probation
officers are substantial; probation officers have extensive supervisory and
administrative duties to the defendants under their supervision. 161 Their
duties include: informing those on supervision regarding their terms of
supervised release; watching over them to ensure adherence to the terms;
and reporting any violation thereof. 162 “Probation officers, therefore, may
serve many roles at the court’s option and can significantly impact the
determination of a defendant’s conditions of supervised release . . . .” 163
Because of their extensive roles, probation officers serve as the overseers
for the offenders, aimed to shepherd them to a life free of crime. Courts,
however, impermissibly delegated tasks to probation officers that
adversely impact defendants; such an action is impermissible.164
Furthermore, punitive decision-making authority coupled with unclear
terms of supervised release greatly heightens concerns for just treatment
of defendants.
One of the challenges presented by the condition at the heart of this
discussion is that probation officers, like the defendants they supervise,
can have uncertainty regarding the exact prohibited conduct. Due to the
lack of explicit parameters of the condition, probation officers can fail at
clearly describing prescribed boundaries as required by the statute. 165
This notice requirement is vital in ensuring that the supervisee obeys the
conditions set forth by the sentencing judge. 166 Therefore, if the probation
model of punishment because they provide[] the crucial information needed to individualize
sentences.”).
159. Taylor S. Rothman, Fourth Amendment Rights of Probationers: The Lack of Explicit
Probation Conditions and Warrantless Searches, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 839, 852 (2016)
(arguing that because it is the probation officers’ responsibility to not only provide guidance,
but also to enforce the law, their duties “create[] a conflict in the relationship between [the
defendant] and [the] officer.”).
160. Sleight, supra note 138, at 125.
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 3603 (2018); see also Sleight, supra note 138, at 125–26.
162. Sleight, supra note 138, at 125–26.
163. Id. at 126.
164. See United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The fate of [a]
defendant must rest with the district court, not the probation office.”); see also United States v.
Browder, 866 F.3d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that although sentencing courts can delegate
minor details to probation office, decision-making authority may not be delegated, for it would
make defendant’s liberty contingent on officer’s exercise of discretion).
165. § 3603.
166. DAVIS, supra note 107 (“Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two
independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary
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officer is uncertain regarding the prohibited conduct—as one may be
given the vagueness of the condition imposed—the supervisee is bound to
be at least as uncertain as to what conduct is permitted. “Courts have
warned against according undue deference to a probation officer’s
interpretation of a condition of supervision, as ‘a probation officer could
well interpret the term more strictly than intended by the court or
understood by’ the individual being supervised.” 167 The condition’s
terms, accordingly, must be explicit at the time of imposition—rather than
being supplemented by the probation officers charged with policing
supervisees’ conduct—in order to foster greater compliance.
“Probation officers’ response[s] to noncompliance, new crime, and
technical [violations are] all guided by [either] the policies of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, and
the judge [presiding over the case].” 168 Federal policy gives little
discretion pertaining to new felony-level crime violations and requires
probation officers to promptly report any violations to the court. 169 If the
supervisee violates a condition, post-imprisonment supervision will be
revoked. Additionally, a new term of incarceration, ranging between four
and sixty-three months—“depending on the nature of the violation and the
supervisee’s original offense and criminal history”—will be imposed. 170
The response is different when it comes to minor violations, such as
misdemeanors, new crimes, and technical violations.
The violations do not have to be reported to the court if the
“[probation] officer determines (1) that such violation is minor, and
not part of a continuing pattern of violations; and (2) that nonreporting will not present an undue risk to an individual or the public
or be inconsistent with any directive of the court relative to reporting
violations.” However, even if such violations are not reported to the
court, probation officers are still required to take timely and
proportional action in response to the violations. Officers can act
within existing conditions of supervision conditions or seek to have
the conditions modified by the court with the consent of the

people to understand what conduct it prohibits. Second, it may authorize and even encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”).
167. United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 358 (3rd Cir. 2008) (quoting United States
v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002)).
168. Matthew G. Rowland, Too Many Going Back, Not Enough Getting Out?:
Supervision Violators, Probation Supervision, and Overcrowding in the Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 77 FED. PROB., Sept. 2013, at 3, 7.
169. Id. See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2018).
170. Rowland, supra note 168, at 8.
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supervisee. 171

Because a violation of the frequenting condition is likely to be a
technical violation—for its unclear prohibitions, rather than felony-level
or a new violation that mandates judicial review—probation officers are
permitted to take decisive actions, and subsequently, circumvent judicial
scrutiny. 172
This authority provided to the probation officers is in violation of
Article III of the Constitution. 173 The power to impose the punishment for
federal crimes provided for by law is a judicial task, reserved exclusively
for the Article III courts. 174 Although limited delegation of such is
constitutionally permissible, the delegation of this power surpasses realms
of administrative, scheduling, and managerial duties, and therefore
violates the Constitution. 175 Of course “delegation of [judicial] authority
to probation officers . . . provides courts with necessary flexibility,” 176 but
the line between constitutional and unconstitutional delegation is very
fine.
Once a probation officer is given punitive decision-making authority,
the limitations devised by the Framers during the drafting process of
Article III 177 Although it comes as no surprise that the courts are ill-suited
in the micro-managerial aspects of post-imprisonment supervision, the
balance of power between the courts and probation officers must not
exceed Constitutionally-provided boundaries. 178 Furthermore, probation
officers are not equipped with the capacity to remedy a problematic
condition. 179 Put differently, “‘[a] vague supervised release condition
cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of
interpretation.’” 180 Vesting probation officers with power to interpret

171. Id. (first alteration in original).
172. Rothman, supra note 159, at 852 (stating that “[t]he broad authority bestowed upon
a correctional officer can also become ‘simply a means of circumventing normal constitutional
procedures in a criminal investigation.’”).
173. See U.S. CONST. art. III; see also United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th
Cir. 2005).
174. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 40–41 (1916).
175. Sleight, supra note 138, at 141–42.
176. Id. at 142–43.
177. Id. at 141–42.
A court may delegate administrative, scheduling, or managerial authority over
sentencing conditions without running afoul of its Article III power, however, because
the court still determines a defendant’s punishment under such a delegation. If a court
delegates punitive decision-making authority, however, it has violated the
Constitution because only courts can exert “[t]he judicial [p]ower.”
Id.
178. Id. at 142.
179. United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 359, 359 (3rd Cir. 2008).
180. United States v. Evans, 883 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2018).
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conditions “on an ad hoc and subjective basis create[s] one of the very
problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect.” 181
In the case of Soulemane Barry,182 his probation officer’s duties were,
inter alia, to ensure that the conditions imposed upon him were obeyed
and to provide guidance regarding the conditions and their terms. 183
Barry’s probation officer had the discretion to determine whether Barry
had visited (or, more specifically, frequented) forbidden places. Because
uncertainty is inherent in the condition’s terms, the probation officer
charged with overseeing the defendant attains a more punitive role, as
opposed to his intended supervisory position. This is because the
probation officer, who is in closer contact with the offender than the
sentencing court, determines whether the condition has been violated. 184
The officer ultimately makes the judgment of whether the defendant can
continue to enjoy their (albeit restricted) freedom, or if the terms of postimprisonment supervision were violated.185 As a result, the probation
officer transcends the limits of the power initially delegated to him.
This transcendence is critical. If the probation officer deems a
specific location as one that the supervisee is forbidden from visiting, the
probation officer assumes the role of the judge, the jury, and ultimately
the executioner when making his determinations. By doing so, the
probation officer goes against the prohibitions pronounced by the Evans
court and, in fact, remedies the condition’s vagueness. 186 If the sentencing
courts delegate the power to monitor a defendant subject to supervised
release to probation officers, it is imperative that judges explicitly provide
what areas are forbidden. By clarifying the terms of supervised release,
the sentencing courts are remedying the deficiencies of the conditions’
terms, rather than leaving such determinations to the officers. If probation
officers are charged with explicating the vague conditions’ terms and
enforcing them against the defendant, they assume the punitive role
reserved specifically for the judiciary. Accordingly, if the officers are
charged with decision-making powers, probation officers violate Article
III of the Constitution. 187 To rectify the situation, sentencing courts
should limit probation officers’ duties to avoid discretionary and arbitrary
181. Id.
182. See infra Section I.C.
183. See 18 U.S.C. § 3603 (1984) (describing duties of probation officers).
184. See Sleight, supra note 138, at 142–143.
185. Id. at 125–26 (“Should a defendant violate any condition of supervised release, the
supervising probation officer must report the violation to the court and the U.S. Department of
Justice.”).
186. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
187. Sleight, supra note 138, at 142. “Limited delegation is practical because courts are
ill-positioned to micromanage defendants after sentencing.” Id. Such delegation, so long as it
is controlled and minimal, “complies with the Constitution because it requires judges to set
defendants’ sentencing conditions, not probation officers.” Id.
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enforcement of vague supervised release conditions. The determination
of whether a condition was violated is a decision reserved strictly for the
court, not for the probation officer.
III. REMEDYING THE ISSUES CREATED BY VAGUE SUPERVISED
RELEASE CONDITIONS
Supervised release is permeated with vagueness issues that contradict
and undermine the program’s very essence. Accordingly, a remedy for
the class of people subject to the “frequenting” condition who are still
serving their prison sentences must be crafted. 188 The appropriate remedy
comes in three parts. First, vague or problematic terms of supervised
release must be removed to avoid further complications. Second,
defendants should urge the reviewing court to utilize the sentencing
package doctrine in striking conditions that no longer serve the overall
purpose of the entire sentence. 189 Finally, public policy considerations
demonstrate why the imposition of vague supervised release conditions is
detrimental to defendants. The over-inclusive imposition of supervised
release is contrary to the purposes of the supervision program. Therefore,
the courts must exercise greater caution when imposing conditions that
make reasonable minds “guess at [the condition’s] meaning and differ as
to its application.” 190 By reducing the uncertainty in conditions’ terms,
supervised release will serve its intended rehabilitative, preventative, and
assimilative purposes.
A. Applying the Statutory Remedy
Section 3583(e) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides a
framework for defendants seeking to revoke or modify the conditions
imposed upon them. 191 The court may “modify . . . the conditions of
supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the
term.” 192 The sentencing court’s determination of whether to modify or
revoke a supervised release term is aided by subsections 3553(a)(1)–(7),
which, among other things, focuses on the nature of the sentence imposed

188. Even though the condition analyzed was removed from the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines at the end of the 2016 year, defendants who received their sentences prior to the
condition’s excision are nonetheless subject to its terms. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra
note 33 and accompanying text. Although there is no readily-available data on how many
defendants are serving a term of supervised release after the revocation of the condition, “[t]he
most recent figures show that by the end of 2010, there were 103,423 people on supervised
release and 206,968 people in the federal prisons.” Doherty, supra note 3, at 1014.
189. See United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 380–82 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying the
sentencing package doctrine).
190. United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2008).
191. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)–(4) (1984).
192. § 3583(e)(2).
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and its necessity. 193
As established above, sentencing judges overuse supervised release
and subject nearly every defendant put through the court system to some
period of post-imprisonment supervision. 194 By consistently applying the
same set of standard supervised release conditions, the sentencing courts
fail to utilize this form of post-imprisonment for its full and intended
purpose. 195 Because the main focus of the inquiry is whether supervised
release is necessary, the courts—by universally applying a set of
conditions—disregard the necessary element that is central to federal
supervision. Ergo, because some supervised release conditions are
discretionary, the determination of whether supervision is merited should
be subject to scrupulous (or, at least adequate) analysis. As provided by
Nora Demleitner, “[f]ederal judges may need to begin to focus on
questions of whether to impose [supervised release], for how long, and
what discretionary conditions to attach,” 196 rather than heavy-handedly
imposing conditions. If this change comes to fruition, “[d]ecreases in
length and conditions would likely result in a substantial decline in the
number of revocations.” 197
Accordingly, because the necessary prong is crucial in the
determination of whether supervised release should be imposed,
Soulemane Barry’s sentence (and the sentences of defendants in similar
predicaments, subject to similar conditions as him) deserves a
modification. 198 Judicial review of the conditions, whether occurring
prior to the sentencing or thereafter, would eliminate the over-imposition
of supervised release and break the cyclical nature of federal postimprisonment supervision. 199 With heightened judicial scrutiny, issues
presented by ambiguous conditions would be of less concern. By avoiding
the imposition of problematic conditions, sentencing courts respect the
purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act by increasing consistency and
avoiding disparity in federal sentencing. 200 Therefore, the courts must
painstakingly scrutinize the conditions before imposing them upon the
defendants. Because Section 3583(e) allows for reconsideration of
sentences, defendants are able to utilize the statutory scheme to challenge
vague conditions and urge for their cure.

193. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7) (1984).
194. Demleitner, supra note 23, at 232 (“Without regard to individual risk or needs,
courts seem to impose at least all the standard discretionary conditions.”).
195. Id. (outlining the intended purposes of supervised release).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. The modification would be pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) (1984).
199. See supra Part II.B.
200. Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland, Some Thoughts on the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1291, 1297 (1986).
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B. Applying the Sentencing Package Doctrine
The next available remedy is judicial review. The sentencingpackage doctrine is a mechanism used by the courts to reconsider the full
sentence, when one part of the whole is vacated or overturned. 201 The
court in United States v. Pimienta-Redondo stated that when the
sentencing court finds a defendant guilty on a multicount indictment,
“there is a strong likelihood that the district court will craft a disposition
in which the sentences on the various counts form part of an overall
plan.” 202 And when a component of the total sentence package is stricken
from the defendant’s record,
common sense dictates that the judge should be free to review the
efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan, and to
reconstruct the sentencing architecture upon remand, within
applicable constitutional and statutory limits, if that appears necessary
in order to ensure that the punishment still fits both [the] crime and
[the] criminal. 203

The application of this doctrine to vague supervised release
conditions can remedy this dilemma. Once a reviewing court determines
that the condition imposed is ambiguous in its terms and application, the
court must choose to remand the case to have the condition be stricken
from the package and to holistically reconsider the entire sentence.204
The application of the doctrine is in tune with the previously
mentioned notions of fairness, consistency, and need to avoid disparity in
sentencing. 205 The doctrine’s purpose is to establish fairness in sentencing
multicount offenders. If one of the counts is dismissed, the purpose of the
sentencing package may be undermined. Accordingly, it is essential to
ensure that each of the counts reflects a sentence necessary and
proportional to the crime committed. 206 By vacating conditions that do
not serve the Sentencing Reform Act’s greater rehabilitative purposes,207
sentencing courts have the potential of breaking the self-fulfilling
prophesies inherent in the blanket imposition of post-incarceration
supervision. 208 Furthermore, when supervised release conditions are
201. See United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1989).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Robert Howell, Sentencing Reform Lessons: From the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 to the Feeney Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069, 1070 (2004) (“The goal
and structure of the [Sentencing Reform Act] was to achieve uniformity in federal sentencing.”).
206. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 14, at (b)(1) (courts may
impose SR conditions “to the extent that such conditions . . . are reasonably related to. . . nature
and circumstances of the offense. . . .”).
207. See Demleitner, supra note 23, at 232.
208. See Doherty, supra note 3, at 1018 (“Supervised release, enforced by revocation and
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imposed without a clear need to do so, the purpose of federal supervision
undermines rehabilitative notions and instead sanctions defendants for
alleged violations of their terms. 209 This, in and of itself, is problematic.
But when coupled with conditions that are impermissibly vague,
defendants are at the mercy of the system rather than in control of their
own freedom. 210
Accordingly, if a defendant is subject to a vague condition failing to
address prohibited conduct, he can take the matters into his own hands.
By petitioning the court to review the condition at the end of the prison
term, supervised release conditions imposed will then be reviewed. Doing
so would shift the judicial focus away from the prison term and onto the
condition of supervised release, thereby avoiding arbitrary enforcement
and unclear parameters.
C. Policy Considerations
By subjecting defendants guilty of crimes that do not merit the
imposition of supervised release, the courts are disregarding the necessary
component of the inquiry. 211 Failing to determine whether the conditions
are actually necessary to the defendant’s circumstances undermines the
purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. 212 A heavy hand must not apply
to supervised release, or else the system, and the defendants going through
it, suffer. 213 Therefore, if greater judicial scrutiny is employed and unclear
conditions are not imposed, the cycle—where the defendant unknowingly
violates his terms of supervised release and may be subject to
incarceration—can be put to rest.
Another possible way to combat this dilemma is to ensure that judges,
at the time of sentencing, not only discuss the conditions of supervised
release imposed, but also establish what violations would result in
reimprisonment. By shedding light on impermissible conduct, sentencing
judges tackle any future confusion early on. Because supervised release

re[-]incarceration, is premised on the notion that rehabilitation (in addition to deterrence) can
be effectively generated by the threat of more punishment.”).
209. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
210. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2018). A violation of a condition of supervised release may
result in revocation of the release and a sentence of imprisonment. Id. The underlying violation
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. But when violations are due to unclear
parameters, defendants may be unknowingly engaged in violating conduct, and thus risk being
resentenced to a prison term. Id.
211. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 709 (2000) (holding supervised release is
different from its parole counterpart; it grants the sentencing courts with “the freedom to provide
post[-]release supervision for those, and only those, who needed it.”).
212. See infra Section III A–C.
213. Doherty, supra note 3, at 1025 (“Despite the mounting body of conditions, there has
been little analysis of the purpose underlying these conditions or the justification for applying
them so broadly.”).
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acts as an asterisk at the end of one’s prison sentence, 214 it is imperative
to spell out prohibited and permitted conduct at the inception of the
judicial proceedings, rather than review them on appeal. 215 If the
defendants are not put on notice as to what conduct will subject them to
re-incarceration, the courts undermine and weaken the purposes of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 216 Defendants must know what is
impermissible from the very start of their sentence, and must be reminded
of the conditions’ terms at the time of their release. Otherwise, the
punitive consequences for violations masquerade under the rehabilitative
purpose of supervised release. 217
As expected, appellate courts will continue to afford “substantial
deference to the decisions of the sentencing judge[s].” 218 Therefore, if
sentencing judges are not careful in determining whether supervised
release is merited (or necessary), the reviewing courts are less likely to
confront vagueness issues inherent in ambiguous supervised release
conditions. 219
Furthermore, the over-imposition of supervised release can have
financially damaging effects on the courts and the defendants stuck in this
cyclical process. Since reintegration is at the heart of post-imprisonment
supervision, 220 resources should be allocated to accomplish such a goal.
Instead, this goal is yet to be achieved and is yet to receive adequate
resources to aid its fruition. 221 As provided by Fiona Doherty, “the sizable
resources that we now spend on supervised release might be productively
transferred to job programs inside and outside prison.” 222 Such a
reallocation of funds would reinforce the purposes of the Act by aiding

214. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. background (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018) (noting that supervised release “is an order of supervision in
addition to any term of imprisonment imposed by the court.”) (emphasis added).
215. See United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 838–39 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that
supervised release conditions must be appropriately. tailored, adequately justified, and orally
pronounced after proper notice).
216. See Demleitner, supra note 23, at 232 (providing that the purposes of Sentencing
Reform Act are rehabilitative, not punitive, and by failing to provide clear parameters of the
conditions’ terms, the sentencing courts undermine the Act’s intentions).
217. See Doherty, supra note 3, at 961 (“Supervised release [does not] serve the goals of
certainty and transparency advanced by the twentieth century proponents of the determinate
sentence. In fact, no clear penological or adjudicative principles validate supervised release in
its current form.”).
218. See Van Graafeiland, supra note 200, at 1297.
219. As can be observed from the principal case, the appellate review in Defendant
Barry’s circumstances did not reach its full fruition because, as noted by Judge Smith’s opinion,
the District Court did not commit plain error.
220. See Demleitner, supra note 23, at 232.
221. See Number of Offenders, supra note 123 and accompanying text (stating that there
is little evidence that supervised release accomplishes its intended goals).
222. Doherty, supra note 3, at 1030.
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former prisoners reintegrate into society. Considering the central
purposes of supervised release are rehabilitation and reintegration, 223
maximum efforts must be put into the accomplishment of these purposes.
Perhaps the solution to the problem identified in this Note may best
be left for Congress to address. Since the legislative branch has already
caused a ripple effect with its eradication of federal parole and the
imposition of the Sentencing Reform Act in its stead, 224 this is an issue
that can be remedied by congressional efforts. As noted by Robert
Howell, “[t]he recent enactment of the sentencing reforms contained in
the PROTECT Act are proof that Congress believes the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 was unsuccessful.” 225 The fact that Congress passed
a separate, yet closely related Act, demonstrates that the lawmakers are
capable, and clearly ready, to intervene.
Their intervention can be aimed at limiting the imposition of
supervised release by imposing this form of post-imprisonment
supervision on a narrow set of cases showing extraordinary need for
federal monitoring. Congress could also impose durational limits on
supervised release, therefore taking away the courts’ heavy-handed
imposition of federal supervision on any of the federal offenders. But the
most impactful method of legislative intervention would come from
clarifying the Sentencing Reform Act by, addressing its deficiencies and
reinforcing the foundation upon which it was enacted: to establish fairness
and avoid disparity.
Due to the lack of judicial uniformity regarding this issue, it is
imperative to ensure that the broad and unnecessary imposition of
conditions, coupled with the inadvertent imposition of ambiguous terms,
is remedied. The remedy can be administered in a few ways, three of
which are presented here. 226 Legislative intervention is most preferred,
because an intervention by the lawmakers would be concrete,
particularized to the issue, and most importantly, codified in a statute.
On the other side, the judicial branch is equally capable of remedying
the issues presented in this Note. In fact, there is an argument to be made
that judicial intervention is preferable. Because the courts are intertwined
in the criminal system and have personal first-hand experience with what
approach provides most promising—and longest-lasting—results,
sentencing judges must construct clear conditions that do not run afoul of
the Sentencing Reform Act’s purposes. However, if the remedy is
223. See supra note 80.
224. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976;
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987.
225. Howell, supra note 205 at 1076.
226. Although there is more room for discussion regarding potential avenues at solving
the issue presented (and confronted in discussed case-law), the panacea discussion is limited to
only those judicial and legislative treatments mentioned throughout this Note.
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provided by a combination of the two branches, the results may yield the
greatest benefit.
CONCLUSION
There is no place for vagueness in supervised release conditions. The
Sentencing Reform Act’s purpose was to eliminate disparity and to
promote fairness in sentencing. 227 Vagueness and uncertainty undermine
the Act’s purpose, and instead, terms of supervised release become more
detrimental than beneficial. 228 Because the imposition of federal
supervised release is so widespread, sentencing judges must exercise
heightened caution, as well as be forward-thinking. These precautions,
and focus on practicality, can prevent defendants from being subjected to
a life of uncertainty, thereby preventing a plethora of future problems.

227. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2018).
228. See Number of Offenders, supra note 123 (noting that “extended periods of
community supervision can have negative consequences for offenders and the public.”).

